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With rare exception, academic definitions or descriptions of populism are seldom clearly false or totally 
inaccurate. At the same time, there is scarcely a definition useful enough to theoretically explain the 
universal cause(s) of populism. Moreover, many studies on populism do not present a clear definition 
of the term. And furthermore, and relatedly, explanations as to the roots of populism, if they are pre-
sent, markedly differ and often seem rather country-specific, speculative or missing entirely in many 
of these studies. 
 In this contribution we go beyond the current lack of academic consensus about the roots of pop-
ulism and, in a sense, go back to the older theoretical explanation of populism’s universal origins. This, 
in turn, allows us to understand and suggest a proper method of how to research the causes of pop-
ulism, as well as to suggest a proper definition of it. Finally, this allows us to come not only to a general, 
proper theoretical and empirical research approach on how to study populism but, in effect, also to a 
blueprint of how to tackle the emergence of populism.
 Thus, this chapter argues that research on populism is often marked by failed attempts to find some 
tangible criteria or common features that, ultimately, should somehow unify the roots of all types of 
populism. At best, this effort results in frustration among researchers in their attempts to identify such 
universal causes either on a theoretical or a practical level. Of course, some common external features 
of populism have been identified, such as demonstrating the central position of the people, being criti-
cal of the elite, perceiving the people as a homogeneous entity, and proclaiming a serious crisis.2 
In the view of Cas Mudde, the key distinction of populism is morality.3 This is, however, usually misun-
derstood normatively when populism is seen negatively. Instead, in our view, the morality of populism 
1 “This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under 
grant agreement No 822590 (DEMOS). Any dissemination of the results presented hereby reflects only the consorti-
um’s (or, if applicable, the author’s) view. The agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information 
it contains.” The author is thankful to Martin Mejstřík for his editorial intervention.
2 Matthijs Rooduijn, “The Nucleus of Populism: In Search of the Lowest Common Denominator,” Government and Oppo-
sition 49, no. 4 (2014): 572–598.
3 Hille Hanso, “Mudde: Populism Is Based on Morals,” International Centre for Defence and Security, May 23, 2018, 
https://icds.ee/en/mudde-populism-is-based-on-morals/.
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should be used as a research tool. Andor4 seems to be right in pointing out that the key reason for the 
failure to understand populism might be that the generalizations of populism theory offer a binary 
analysis, while the sociopolitical reality is multidimensional. Moreover, it is often unacknowledged that 
there must be something missing in this or any other definition of populism – namely, a specific, clearly 
identifiable ideology. Otherwise, it would not be populism but something else (e.g., fascism or commu-
nism). However, those features of populism as identified by Rooduijn and others are more of descriptive 
nature and, as such, are further studied either at the rhetorical-discursive level, the ideational level 
and/or the political-strategic level. In fact, Rooduijn5 incorrectly separated the proclamation of a crisis 
from the core of populism and identified it as a consequence. Thus, even empirical comparative studies 
may bring inconsistent results. Yet the morality noted by Mudde and the proclamation of a crisis6, also 
defined by Rooduijn, actually fit together very well empirically as well as for the study of populism.
 Be that as it may, there are in fact two overlapping groups of mainstream approaches to the research 
of populism: (a) a broad or thick ideology, a thin or narrowly understood ideology and a discourse or 
style and (b) the ideational approach, a political-strategic approach and a sociocultural approach. 
However, neither of these two broad groups of approaches offer a universally valid definition(s) for the 
roots of populism. Therefore, they are even less likely to be seen as trustworthy theoretical explana-
tions of the proper method of analysis, and, ultimately, of its “cure”. 
 Yet, it is significant for our study that Rooduijn7, who has identified three key common features 
of populism, came to only two suitable definitions of it. The first is attributed to Mudde, although it 
originally reflects Laclau’s concept of “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups”. The second definition is “a Manichenean discourse”. 
In fact, even this definition can be seen as a reflection of Laclau’s original idea and not significantly 
different from the former. Importantly, Rooduijn (wrongly) noted that neither of these two definitions 
include all the elements of the lowest common denominator of populism. It is argued here that this is a 
fundamentally incorrect conclusion. That’s why we have presented only selections of both definitions 
that contain their definitional core and, at the same time, show inspiration from Laclau. It is acknowl-
edged here that Laclau’s concept of populism is, paradoxically, the least often used concept of pop-
ulism, although it can also be seen as a bridge to understanding populism as ideology.8 In contrast, the 
promotion of populism to being seen as ideology, the ideational approach, is currently the most popular 
thread of populism studies.
 With the aim of contributing to defining the roots of populism, this study accepts Ernesto Laclau’s 
late and slightly refined definition of both the roots and external features of populism as a formal polit-
ical logic without predetermined ideological content. This definition is, although not acknowledged as 
such, in Rooduijn’s conclusions of his cited comparative study. Thus, Laclau’s original definition will 
be revised and updated and then compared with the criteria used to assess the quality and applicabil-
ity of concepts in the social sciences. It is argued here that this definition fulfils the key criteria used 
to assess that quality and applicability. Contrarywise, the current mainstream definitions of populism 
mostly do not comply with the key criteria for this assessment. Thus, they cannot be seen as a universal 
explanation(s) of the roots of populism. 
4 László Andor, “Against a General Theory of Populism: The Case of East-Central Europe,” Intereconomics 5, no.1. 
(2020): 21–26.
5 Rooduijn, “The Nucleus,” 593.
6 See Yannis Stavrakakis, Giorgos Katsambekis, Alexandros Kioupkiolis et al., “Populism, anti-populism and crisis,” 
Contemporary Political Theory 17 (2018): 4–27.
7 Rooduijn, “The Nucleus,” 592.
8 Michal Kubát, “Úvod do studia populismu,” in Populismus v časech krize, ed. Michal Kubát, Martin Mejstřík, and Jiří 
Kocián (Prague: Karolinum, 2016), 14.
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However, the herein offered and, in fact, well-known definition of the roots of populism provides such a 
general theoretical explanation and implicitly suggests a traditional scientific method for its analysis. 
The major criticism of this type of definition has been its difficulty and impossible utilization for further 
empirical analysis of populism;9 yet, overcoming this methodological challenge is a surprisingly simple 
task. However, let us first focus on the fundamental problems with the concept of populism.
Defining the Concept of Populism
According to Freidenberg10, there are certain problems in defining the concept of populism. First, is 
conceptual ambiguity: The utilized term “populism” often does not define the exact meaning and the 
primary domain of the concept (politics, economics, psychology, etc.) and usually is not clearly limited 
in scope. In other words, Freidenberg argues that we do not know whether the psychological nature 
(uncertainty or fear), the economy (crisis, inflation, unemployment, relative or absolute decline in the 
standard of living), a political issue (primary mistrust of either political regime and/or political elites) 
or other problems are the mainstays or main manifestations of populism in different definitions or 
studies. 
 It is, however, evident that the uncertainty may depend on personal socioeconomic situations or 
perceptions of them as well as the blame attributed – whether legitimately or not – to primarily local, 
but sometimes foreign politicians for this economic situation. For example, Hofrichter11 argues that 
the key to understanding the growth of populism lies in the global growth of income inequality since 
the 1980s. More specifically, research by Anduiza and Rico12 suggests that the main explanation for 
populist attitudes is not the vulnerability or economic hardship suffered by the people, but rather the 
perceptions that citizens have about the economic situation.13 
 Thus, what if the conceptual ambiguity of populism is the strength and a typical fundamental fea-
ture of populism? In other words, populism may be caused by many factors, often mutually interacting, 
and sometimes actually contradicting each other. Moreover, it can have many manifestations. Still, 
there is something in common, as we have already suggested when citing Laclau’s definition. 
 According to the second critical point raised by Freidenberg, there is an insufficient empirical defi-
nition of the concept, namely its vagueness, with indefinite boundaries and reference points. In other 
words, populism means almost everything, and, as a result, the expression has no specific meaning. 
According to Freidenberg, populism is used within contexts of downstream definitions that are too 
slim and too specific. The definitions used are too general and difficult to use in empirical research. 
Each researcher has an initial intuitive idea with which he approaches this linguistic term, concludes 
Freidenberg. 
 For example, most contributions to conceptual approaches to populism, as employed in 158 arti-
cles on populism published in 14 selected political science journals between 1990–2015, actually do 
not fall among the four categories suggested by The Oxford Handbook of Populism: cultural, economic, 
9 See José Luis Berlanga and Jorge Ledo, “The Liberal Roots of Populism: A Critique of Laclau,” CR: The New Centen-
nial Review 10, no. 2 (2010): 51–182 or Kubát, “Úvod.”
10 In Radek Buben, Vladimíra Dvořáková, and Jan Němec, Que el pueblo mande!: Levicové vlády, populismus a změny 
režimu v Latinské Americe (Prague: Slon, 2012), 122.
11 Stefan Hofrichter, “The Economics of Populism,” October 2017, https://www.allianzgi.com/-/media/allianzgi/global-
agi/documents/allianzgi-stefanhofrichter-the-economics-of-populism.pdf. 
12 Eva Anduiza and Guillem Rico, “Economic correlates of populist attitudes: An analysis of nine European countries,” 
2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308962315_Economic_Correlates_of_Populist_Attitudes_An_Analy-
sis_of_Nine_European_Countries_in_the_Wake_of_the_Great_Recession.
13 Iveta Pauhofová, Beáta Stehlíková, Peter Staněk, and Michal Páleník, Súvislosti príjmovej polarizácie na Slovensku III 
(Bratislava: The Institute of Economy of Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2018).
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ideological and strategic. Many authors simply did not present a definition of populism, or they devel-
oped a conceptualization that was very unclear argue Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy.14 
Moreover, instead of many definitions or definitions based on formal “external” features, one needs a 
definition that would be in line with concepts used in social sciences. We are going to discuss this issue 
in further detail later.
 Thirdly, according to Freidenberg15, there are biases in researching populism. In general, Yakov-
lyev16 demonstrated that the essence of the concepts of populism (following the ‟essentially contested 
concepts” theory introduced by W. B. Gallie in 1956) can be contested on the basis of the ideological 
stances taken by the contesting parties, as well as because of the choice of terms and methodologies 
embodied in the discussion over the correct uses of such concepts. For example, Aslanidis17 identi-
fied regional bias18, policy bias19 and normative bias20 in the study of populism. Sometimes regional 
and normative biases converge. Carpenter21 offered a culture-based explanation for the emergence of 
populism. Specifically, in his view, two types of political culture and institutions emerged, or rather 
survived in post-communist countries – the “traditional” and the “civic”. Thus, legacies of political 
subjugation and backward socioeconomic conditions allegedly led to populism, whereas more wel-
comed civic political cultures and institutions arose as a result of greater political autonomy. Similarly, 
Kovács22 distinguished between pre-modern and post-modern populism. In his view, while the former is 
characterized by a reliance on past values and was present in post-communist countries, the latter was 
found in Western Europe to be more oriented towards the present, and its quintessential representa-
tive was Jörg Haider in Austria. However, there is a consensus and empirical evidence that populism 
can be present in highly economically and culturally developed countries such as the United Kingdom 
or the United States. 
 Normative biases can also be found as a major tool used for analysis of political party manifestos, 
although researchers rarely acknowledge these biases.23 Andor24 explains these biases as a result of 
the fact that ‟liberals tend to dominate populism studies in both Europe and the US”.
14 Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism. A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Critstóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina, Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 99–128.
15 In Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 122.
16 Maksym Yakovlyev, “Essentially contested concepts as a tool in political studies: definition and criteria,” Granì 23, no. 
3 (2020): 17–26.
17 Paris Aslanidis, “Avoiding Bias in the Study of Populism,” Chinese Political Science Review 2 (2017): 266–287.
18 When certain perspectives that only befit region-specific manifestations of populism are erroneously promoted to defin-
ing properties of supposedly general applicability. 
19 Where populism is reduced to an economic recipe that purportedly wreaks havoc on national economies. 
20 This relates to partisan assessments of populism’s impact on democracy, with the aim to denigrate ideological adversar-
ies or celebrate favourites.
21 Michael Carpenter, “Slovakia and the triumph of nationalist populism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30, 
no. 2 (1997): 205–219.
22 János M. Kovács, “Uncertain Ghosts: Populists and Urbans in Postcommunist Hungary,” in The Limits of Social Cohe-
sion. Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies, ed. P. L. Berger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 113–145.
23 Kostas Gemenis, “What to Do (and Not to Do) with the Comparative Manifestos Project Data,” Political Studies 61, no. 
1 (2013): 3–23; Mattia Zulianello, “Analyzing party competition through the comparative manifesto data: some theo-
retical and methodological considerations,” Quality & Quantity 48 (2013): 1723–1737; Wojciech Woźniak, “Programy 
polskich partii politycznych jako materiał empiryczny w badaniach dyskursu politycznego,” Środkowoeuropejskie Stu-
dia Polityczne 2 (2017): 41–58; Pippa Norris, “Measuring Populism Worldwide,” Faculty Research Working Paper 
Series, HKS Working Paper No. RWP20-002 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3541314.
24 Andor, “Against.”
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 Therefore, we must confront the already discussed key concepts of populism with scientific theo-
ries and methodologies used in conceptualizations. Before doing so, the best way to proceed further 
seems to be a discussion of the basic methodological approaches to comparative analysis. Comparative 
analysis in general is central to theory-building and theory-testing in policy studies,25 and especially if 
it is based on analysis of socioeconomic phenomena in relation to their institutional and sociocultural 
settings.26 
Basic Methodological Approaches to Comparative Analysis
There are two basic methodological approaches to a comparative analysis of certain sociopolitical 
phenomena, including populism. The first is radial, while the other is classical – sometimes called the 
Sartori model. Weyland27 expanded these two categories with a third category known as the cumula-
tive approach. This latter approach or strategy is based on calculating together individual populist 
attributes. However, in that sense, it is redundant and is covered by the two aforementioned basic 
methodological approaches.
 The classical approach assumes that the phenomena can be conceptualized based on defining fea-
tures that must be fully present in each individual case. Weyland28 explains this approach as redefi-
nition. Przeworski and Teune29 speak of a systematic-specific approach; in other words, it may be 
different elements in a different context that can be used as defining features of the same category. 
This approach is validated further by Wittgenstein based on the concept of family resemblance.30 This 
phenomenon can also be observed in the social sciences. Collier and Mahon31 point out that in applying 
this approach, it is necessary to examine the analytical relationship between the attributes that make 
up the “family” binder to support its use in the given category. Collier and Mahon32 consider it always 
counterproductive to exclude parameters that cannot be applied to new cases. In essence, they are 
basically returning to Weber’s idea of an “ideal type”. 
 The radial approach assumes that all the definitive traits must be present in each individual case of 
the phenomenon. Weyland33 calls this approach as based on additions. 
Collier and Mahon34 indicate that it is possible that two members of the same category will not share 
what can be considered the definitive elements in the final measure. Unlike in the family resemblance 
pattern applied in the classical approach, in the case of radial categories the overall importance of 
25 B. Guy Peters, Guillaume Fontaine and Jose-Luis Mendez, “Substance and Methods in the Comparative Study of Policy 
Change,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 20, no. 2 (2018): 133–141.
26 Linda Hantrais, “Contextualization in cross-national comparative research,” International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology 2, no. 2 (1999): 93–108.
27 In Kubát, “Úvod,” 14.
28 Ibid.
29 Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970).
30 This is a possible category of membership in some group, within which the members of this category do not share any 
common element, but we can still recognize members of the human genetic family by observing the elements which they 
share to a certain extent – unlike the non-members of this family who share only a small amount of these elements. The 
similarities are clear although there may not be one mere element that is visibly shared by all members of the family.
31 David Collier and James E. Mahon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analy-
sis,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 845–855.
32 Ibid.
33 In Kubát, “Úvod,” 14.
34 Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual.”
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the category is anchored in the “central subcategory”, that is, in the best possible type or prototype 
of that category. 
 The applied or selected analytic-categorization approach is consequently relevant for the expan-
sion of the given categories. In the application of the radial approach, expanding the secondary char-
acteristics of a category may, paradoxically, outweigh the significance of the primary characteristic. 
As Collier and Mahon35 note, it is an inverse relationship. Populism, as a primary category, should 
then be defined using a reverse mechanism in such a way as to include all the necessary and sufficient 
features so that it could not be disputed that it is always primarily about populism. This issue can be 
illustrated using the erroneous inclusion of radical right-wing parties that are using populist rhetoric 
among populist parties. Within this context, Rydgren36 argues that the radial approach is typical for 
defining populism as a broad or thick ideology.
 If we consider the concept of democracy or popular sovereignty to be closely related to the concept 
of populism, then it is the right direction of research, since Collier and Mahon37 also consider democ-
racy to be a radial category. 
 This approach would justify our understanding of dichotomous populist rhetoric based on a loose 
individualized or country, period-specific ideology (as broadly defined and conceptually narrow at the 
same time) of the nucleus performative expression of populism that has this key element in common. 
In addition, the classical approach will allow us to earmark dichotomous populist rhetoric based on 
a more specific ideology as rhetoric involving the manifestations of populism among primarily non-
populist subjects, such as nationalists, communists or fascists, or radical right parties. 
 In other words, while the full-fledged expression of the populist subject is defined by the former 
sentence, the primarily non-populist subject is defined by the second sentence. 
 In practice, however, we see rather intuitive or mechanical attempts to categorize populist expres-
sions – either the radial or the classical approach – most often in terms of searching for common 
features of populism on a performative level. As a result, many analysts remain puzzled regarding the 
many manifestations of populism, or they have a strict definition and categorization –methodological 
approaches that, on the other hand, exclude a large part of populist expressions.
Typical and Atypical Categories of and Approaches  
to Populism
We can illustrate the issue of confusing and misleading approaches to defining the core elements of 
populism through many examples that by and large reflect the performative38 and binary normative 
aspects of populism. There are some bizarre definitions. Müller39 divided the types of populism into 
“the good, the bad, and the ugly” according to the intensity of its expressions. “Good” populism trans-
lates complicated issues into a simplified form for a wider audience. “Bad” populism leads to negative 
political outcomes as a result of ignoring related or auxiliary costs. “Ugly” populism is characterized 
by all the negative features mentioned above and, moreover, seems to be defined by the search for 
enemies. Finally, in Müller’s view, milder forms of populism may get worse over time.
35 Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual,” 850.
36 Jens Rydgren, “Radical right-wing parties in Europe: What’s populism got to do with it?” Journal of Language and 
Politics 16, no. 4 (June 2017): 1–12.
37 Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual,” 849.
38 Defined as “being or relating to an expression that serves to effect a transaction or that constitutes the performance of 
the specified act by virtue of its utterance,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/performative. 
39 Henrik Müller, “Populism, de-globalization, and media competition: The spiral of noise,” Central European Journal of 
Communication 10, no. 1 (2017): 64–78.
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 It is clear that even though Müller introduced the definition of populism – composed of the three 
elements cited by Mudde in 2004 and of two communication elements – such a confusing and perhaps 
too artistic categorization does not help us to understand the phenomenon of populism.
 Rydgren40 surmised that social scientists in the recent past have applied three different approaches 
to determining the basic categories of populism. Indeed, these are currently the three mainstream 
analytical approaches: the inclusion of populism within what is known as broad or thick ideology, the 
perception of populism as a thin or narrowly understood ideology, and the perception of populism as a 
discourse or style. Significantly, Rydgren noted that these three different approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. Mudde41, as mentioned, merged both thick and thin ideology within the ideational approach, 
which is about ideas in general and ideas about “the people” and “the elite” in particular. Moreover, 
Mudde argues that the ideational approach to populism is the most broadly used in the field of populism 
today. 
 The third category (discourse or style) can be, perhaps surprisingly, found in The Oxford Handbook 
of Populism as split into two further subcategories.42 The first subcategory is a political-strategic 
approach aptly summarized by Weyland43 and defined as “the methods and instruments of winning and 
exercising power”. Then there is a sociocultural approach summarized by Ostiguy44, who introduced a 
key dimension of differentiation in populist political appeals that he calls the “high” and the “low”. 
 We are not going to discuss the pros and cons of these alternative approaches or categories as it 
will be shown that they are less important for our further analysis. 
 Rydgren’s categorization – perhaps inaccurately or differently interpreted – is also found in Havlík 
and Pinková45, who presented three basic groups of populism definitions. First, there are definitions 
of populism as a full-fledged ideology, but, according to Havlík and Pinková, these refer to populism’s 
manifestations in the nineteenth century. However, it begs for specification that the understanding of 
populism as an ideology is also found in recent works. In a significant shift compared to his previous 
work, Učeň46 defined populism as a specific perspective on the nature of politics – as a special ideology. 
Perhaps more accurately, the definition goes beyond the second category in which Pavlík and Pinková 
indicate populism as a not fully-fledged or not completely fulfilled ideology in terms of content (thin-
centred). According to these authors, this explanation is characterized by focusing on certain specific 
aspects of social life, particularly on the structure of political power and the form of the political 
process.
 In the third analytical approach, according to Havlík and Pinková, populism is seen as a political 
practice or a form of political communication. Researchers who belong to the last group, for instance, 
Buben, Němec and Dvořáková47, defined populism as a characteristic feature of democracy, and the 
difference among various populism types then lies only in the intensity, the use of populism and the 
40 Rydgren, “Radical.”
41 Cas Mudde, “Populism. An Ideational Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Critstóbal Rovira Kaltwas-
ser, Paul Taggart, Paulina, Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 44–67.
42 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser Paul Taggart, Paulina, Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
43 Kurt Weyland, “Populism. A Political-Strategic Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Critstóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina, Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 48–72.
44 Ostiguy, “Populism.”
45 Vlastimil Havlík, Aneta Pinková et al., Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe (Brno: Muni Press, 2012), 
19–20.
46 Peter Učeň, “Populist Appeals in Slovak Politics before 2006 elections,” in Democracy and Populism in Central Europe: 
The Visegrad Elections and Their Aftermath, ed. Martin Bútora, Oľga Gyárfášová, Grigorij Mesežnikov, and Thomas W. 
Skladony (Bratislava: IVO, 2007), 171–187.
47 Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 122.
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goals of populist expressions. The aim of Buben, Němec and Dvořáková’s research is then to explore 
populism as a basic political and power strategy combined with an authentic reliance on the concept 
of the people. 
 Buben, Němec and Dvořáková48 also specify that they return to the long-dominating structure of 
definitions and thus see possibilities for populism’s analysis in three traditional analytical categories: 
as a concept (essentially “good” people against “evil” elites), a political style (linguistic shortcuts and 
simplicity) or political strategy (the method and instrument of gaining and exercising power used dur-
ing elections). 
 The problem with the above division is that, as the authors49 themselves acknowledge, “the politi-
cal strategy includes both style and idea”50. But, if that is the case, then there are only two fundamen-
tal manifestations of populism: the idea and political style expressed in the concept of populism, which 
should be used without normative-performative ballast (without terms such as “good” or “bad”). 
This normatively uncontaminated concept of populism is what Laclau calls the constrained logic of 
expressing populist demands. Baiocchi51 calls these demands “unvoiced needs”. It can also be called 
the political substance of populism. 
The Political Substance of Populism
Clearly, the political substance of populism is better understood when we first discuss not the per-
formative-normative but, primarily, the political-moral aspects of populism. In this effort, a two-tier 
categorization of the core of populism, as proposed by Petkovski and Nikolovski52, is helpful. Accord-
ing to them, there are two contradictory approaches to populism studies: a dominant theory that sees 
populism as democratic illiberalism, and Laclau’s theory of hegemony, which sees populism as a formal 
political logic without predetermined ideological content. 
 There are two important and related issues that we must discuss now. First, is populism always 
anti-liberal? And second, is there populism without a liberal normative-political framework? 
 On the first question, Blondel53, Davies54 and Orwin55 argue that liberalism and populism have 
far more in common than is commonly assumed. Practically, populism is usually anti-liberal, but not 
always and not necessarily in a narrow political-ideological meaning. The ideology of liberal democ-
racy became so self-evident and omnipresent that it lost, in many cases, its distinctive meaning; in 
other words, populism can occasionally be based on liberal ideology, but usually it goes against some 
liberal-democratic rights, or perhaps more fundamentally, constitutional human rights. 
48 Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 124 et seq.
49 Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 128.
50 Kubát argues in the same way (Kubát, “Úvod,” 15) – a political strategy inevitably includes a political style.
51 Gianpaolo Baiocchi, We, the Sovereign (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
52 Ljupcho Petkovski and Dimitar Nikolovski, “Populism and Progressive Social Movements in Macedonia: From Rhetori-
cal Trap to Discursive Asset,” Politologický časopis – Czech Journal of Political Science XXIII, no. 2 (2016): 164–181.
53 Michael J. Blondel, “Populism, liberalism, and democracy,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 44, no. 4 (2018): 353–359.
54 Will Davies, “The Neoliberal Spirit of Populism,” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, February 8, 2018, 
https://www.wzb.eu/en/node/.
55 Clifford Orwin, “Why can’t liberalism be populist, too?” The Globe and Mail, September 21, 2018, https://www.theglo-
beandmail.com/opinion/article-why-cant-liberalism-be-populist-too/.
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 Yet there are rare cases when populism is based on liberal ideology, at least in the form of instru-
mentalization56. The analytical overview is complicated or confusing since there are sometimes popu-
lists who apply neoliberal economic policies, or at least there is a neoliberal-populist discourse.57 There 
was over a decade of these policies in South America from the early 1990s until late 2000s.58 All in all 
though, populism usually is anti-liberal by default as one of its features – since it usually emerges in a 
liberal democracy. 
 This issue is related to the second question – whether there occurs populism outside of a liberal 
framework. For example, some argue fascists and Nazi regimes are populist in their very fundamen-
tals. This argument is supported by detailed analyses of the Nazi ideology, which was, at its deepest 
roots, best described as “nihilist”. In other words, it was actually ideologically empty or negative at 
best.59 Eatwell60 suggests that although populism and fascism differ significantly in ideology, the latter 
has borrowed certain aspects of populist discourse and style. On the other hand, populism can degener-
ate into leader-oriented authoritarian and exclusionary (but also inclusionary) politics. Yet there are 
differences between these two that will be presented later on in a table. 
 The most illustrative case here is that of narodniki or narodnichestvo from nineteenth-century Rus-
sia. Interestingly, its earlier interpretation was that of a theory advocating for hegemony of the masses 
over educated elites and represented a grassroot, pragmatic theory of democratic action.61 Arbuet62 
claims, in a rather simplified way, that “populism started as a program and a Russian problem”. Based 
on this example, one can argue that it is possible to have populism in an illiberal and even undemocratic 
society. Yet it should be emphasized that some argue that the Russian narodniki was not an example 
of populism in the sense of the definitions mentioned here because it did not gain the support of the 
masses, and it tried to educate them on the basis of rational arguments.
 Nonetheless, it seems more correct to claim that populism is a formal political logic without pre-
determined ideological content expressing some common political grievances and wishes. There is a 
crisis and a moral issue. In essence, there is a moral crisis of the political regime that is manifested as 
demanding “true” democracy but not necessarily arguing against liberalism. 
 Within this context, a theory of hegemony should be understood on an abstract political and not an 
ideological level (e.g., not as a leftist movement) that goes against any hegemony in a society. We will 
come back to this argument later.
56 See Ben Margulies, “What Geert Wilders and the Antilles can tell us about tensions between populism and liberalism,” 
August 4, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/08/04/what-geert-wilders-and-the-antilles-can-tell-us-about-
tensions-between-populism-and-liberalism/; Davies, “The Neoliberal Spirit.” 
57 Matt Guardino, “Neoliberal populism as hegemony: a historical-ideological analysis of US economic policy discourse,” 
Critical Discourse Studies 15, no. 5 (2018): 444–462.
58 Weyland, “Populism.”
59 Dan Stone, “The Energy of Nihilism: Understanding the Appeal of Nazism,” in Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933–
1939 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 17–44.
60 Roger Eatwell, “Populism and Fascism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Critstóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul 
Taggart, Paulina, Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 436–459.
61 Richard Pipes, “Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry,” Slavic Review 23, no. 3 (1964): 458.
62 Camila Arbuet, “El populismo, una invención Rusa,” Prácticas de Oficio 2, no. 8 (2017): 1–10.
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The Core Substance of Populism
Mudde and Kaltwasser63 wondered whether rhetorical mobilization is a basic characteristic of pop-
ulism or an empirical consequence of populism. As we have already suggested, the answer to this ques-
tion is unambiguous: It is the basic characteristic of populism but, analytically speaking, it is not its 
substance. As put by Morgan64, “Populism is best understood as an intensification of routine political 
dynamics.” In other words, rhetorical mobilization can be associated with a number of emerging ide-
ologies or a demagogue. This is a similar issue as that discussed earlier by Rooduijn65 regarding the 
proclamation of crisis. Both rhetorical mobilization and a proclamation of crisis can be present, but 
they do not represent the substance of populism if seen separately. Both indicators can be found in 
any revolutionary period in history, be that the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution. However, 
we usually do not see either the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution as purely populist move-
ments. 
In any case, we are trying to digest the core of populism at a very abstract, deep political-ideational 
(not ideological, since ideology is more clearly defined) level. The main theorist within this so-called 
discursive group has been Ernesto Laclau. Laclau saw populism as a specific type of political logic – it 
may be better to use the word “politics” instead of “political logic” – characterized by confrontation 
with the existing ideological hegemony and which is able to divide social phenomena into two imagined 
camps, the power bloc (elite) and the people, via the construction of discourse. The discursive context 
in this way sees populism as emerging gradually. 
 In the first stage, various unsolicited requirements are combined into one central nucleus (later 
represented by the populist(s)), but it is possible that the nucleus may be – at least initially – a specific 
type of media, such as the Breitbart News Network in the United States or specific discussion groups 
on Facebook, generating a central nucleus one way or another. For example, for Italy and Beppe Grillo, 
it was his blog66 that, for some time, served as this central nucleus. According to Laclau, the common 
identity of the whole group is created by defining a common enemy. We would change the concept of 
the enemy into the concept of a (political) “representative” or “negatively seen political adversary”. 
Finally, the emotional connection emerges through a leader representing the people.
 The problem with Laclau’s original definition, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser, is that either 
populism is considered to be something ubiquitous, or anything that is not populist cannot be political. 
In our opinion, which explicitly or implicitly also appears in the work of most specialists on this subject, 
populism indeed is politically ubiquitous in liberal democracies although it is not always politically 
dominant or significant in political discourse or directly present in the exercise of political power. As 
put by Drozdova67: 
 Two attributive characteristics of democracy (the idea of freedom and the idea of equality) gener-
ate populism, and the fundamental impossibility of democracy (as an ideal form) ensures its suc-
cess. Therefore, along with the emergence of democratic thinking there is necessarily a populist 
63 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democ-
racy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9.
64 Marcus Morgan, “Cultural Sociology of Populism,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society (2020).
65 Rooduijn, “The Nucleus.”
66 See e.g. Lorenzo Mosca, “The Five Star Movement: Exception or Vanguard in Europe,” The International Specta-
tor 49, no. 1 (2014); Filippo Tronconi, Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication and Ideology 
(Farnham, Ashgate: Routledge, 2015); Martin Mejstřík, The Five Star Movement: Grassroot Movement or an Institu-
tionalized Party? (Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference in Oslo September, 2017), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/
PaperProposal/1122a087-0c19-4867-a260-df42f9628456.pdf.
67 Tetiana Drozdova, “Популізм і демократія,” Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science 5, no. 7 (2019): 1.
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thinking, and the multitude of forms of embodiment of a democratic setting prompts proteism of 
populism.
To simplify, politics and policies can be populist, non-populist and mixed, that is, with an occasional 
greater or lesser admixture of populism. Again, we should remind ourselves that we are essentially 
talking here about conflict and moral issues. Thus, when or why do politics become (more) populist? 
Sušová-Salminen68 pointed to the problem of the fact that European generally cosmopolitan-liberal 
politics is understood to be a conflict-free sphere rather ignoring certain problems. This may result, for 
example, in populist nationalism:
 Unfortunately, at the cost of also believing that consensus means breaking of the political conflict 
per se. Its central eradication from politics leads to the “returning” of conflict from the edges to 
its centre in a radical form, because it leaves the interests and demands of those outside of it to 
be ignored, leaving the space for today’s increasingly prominent political entrepreneurs with fear, 
nervousness and uncertainty.
 
In other words, when broadly understood political-moral issues and controversial issues/policies 
become ignored or seem to be ignored or are not sufficiently/efficiently tackled, then there is a problem 
of populist backlash. As put by Popov69:
 In crisis and transformational periods the actualisation of authoritarian liberalism corresponds to 
the fundamental tension between market capitalism and representative democracy. . . . Authori-
tarian liberalism restricts traditional forms of representative democracy, contributing to the 
reanimation of populism and political radicalism. The authoritarian restriction of representative 
democracy can lead not only to the strengthening of market capitalism, but also to the revival of 
reactionary forms of ‘new nationalism’ and illiberalism.
In fact, these ideas with respect to democracy were summarized much earlier by Sartori70 who argued 
that protest behaviour comes from disillusionment with the real conditions and functioning of demo-
cratic institutions. 
 We will later show that the adjusted definition of Laclau best describes the nature of the emergence 
and transformation of populist logic/politics and cannot therefore be rejected. Given that the “minimal 
definition” (including the smallest number of definition features) is particularly useful in cases of very 
controversial and diversely understood concepts, it is clear that Laclau’s strategy is particularly suit-
able for defining and analysing populism. Within this strategy, the minimum elements necessary and 
sufficient to identify the case as the corresponding concept must be defined71.
 Further discussion will show that other definitions and concepts explaining populism are less ade-
quate or less useful. Before that, however, a discussion about conceptual issues in social sciences seems 
to be of paramount importance.
68 Veronika Sušová-Salminen, “Evropa a sebeurčení. První lekce z katalánského referenda,” !Argument, October 2, 2017, 
http://casopisargument.cz/2017/10/02/evropa-a-sebeurceni-prvni-lekce-z-katalanskeho-referenda/.
69 Maxim Popov, “Authoritarian Liberalism in Contemporary Europe: methodological approaches and conceptual mod-
els,” Politics in Central Europe 15, no. 1 (2019): 443.
70 Giovanni Sartori, Teoria demokracie (Bratislava: Archa, 1993).
71 Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 170.
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Criteria to Assess the Quality and Applicability of Concepts in 
Social Science
Here it is useful to quote Gerring72, who summarized several criteria used to assess the quality and 
applicability of concepts in the social sciences: knowledge, resonance, economy, coherence, differen-
tiation, depth, theoretical usability and validity, and usability in the field research. The problem with 
these criteria is that they may theoretically mutually exclude each other. For example, a definition of 
“economy” is usually opposed to “depth”, while “knowledge” may be inconsistent with “validity” 
(i.e., the ability of the research tool to find out what was intended to be detected). It is clear however 
that Laclau’s concept of populism, or more precisely his theory of populism, unlike other definitions 
and explanations, fulfils most of these conditions. It is noteworthy that Laclau’s theory remains either 
ignored, only vaguely criticized or only mentioned in passing by contemporary analysts of populism.73
 Laclau’s definition and theory of populism is relatively familiar, economical, resonant, coherent, 
allows differentiation and, at the same time, is sufficiently deep. It is also theoretically usable, valid 
and, ultimately, useful in empirical research. Indeed, it is a mystery why it is so often ignored in the 
research of populism. Perhaps behind this rejection, there is the original Marxist orientation of Laclau, 
or, more likely, its combination of simplicity and universality. In the next section, we shall explore why 
there seems to be a problem with Laclau’s theory in empirical research. It is useful to summarize these 
objections as a problem with utilization of Laclau’s general and, apparently, overly broad theory in 
practical social science research. However, we will show that this issue may not be a problem after all. 
In general, if the long-standing problem of social science is ambiguity, confusion and contradiction 
in terms of categories and definitions,74 studying populism is the best proof of this set of drawbacks. 
This methodical problem was first discussed in detail by Giovanni Sartori in 1970 when he began to 
discern and brood about the use of concepts in new cases or even on those known in a different context 
(conceptual travelling) and the problem which arises when an old concept does not address a new case 
(what is known as conceptual stretching). Laclau’s approach solved this dilemma, as will be discussed 
later.
From Research to Theory
Let us first check in further detail the historical overview of how approaches to studying populism have 
developed in academic literature before the current prevailing consensus. Then we shall see that we 
still need to move beyond the current methodological consensus in populism research.
 De la Torre75 and Laclau76 were among the first to summarize several meanings concerning the use 
of the term populism as a basis for generalizing approaches to studying populism. De la Torre77 focused 
72 In Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 167.
73 Mudde, “Populism.”
74 Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual.”
75 Carlos De la Torre, “The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms,” Social Research 59, no. 2 (1992): 
385–414 and Carlos De la Torre, “Populist Redemption and the Unfinished Democratization of Latin America,” Con-
stellations 5, no. 1 (1998): 85–95.
76 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. Capitalism – Fascism – Populism (London, New York: Verso, 
1979).
77 De la Torre, “The Ambiguous.”
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primarily on the analysis of South American examples of populism. According to De la Torre78, the term 
populism is used here to define the forms of sociopolitical mobilization in which the “retarded masses” 
are manipulated by demagogic and charismatic leaders (a political strategy). The second use of the 
term populism refers to the designation of multiple social movements with leadership from the middle 
and upper classes and with the base formed by the people, that is, workers and farmers (a movement). 
The third use of the term populism refers to the historical period in the region’s dependent development 
or the degree in the transition to modernity. The fourth term refers to redistributive, nationalist and 
inclusive state policies (a specific economic policy).
 The fifth use of the term populism meant a type of political party with leaders from middle- and 
upper-level social backgrounds, a strong folk base, nationalist rhetoric, charismatic leadership and 
without clear ideology (a movement). The sixth type of use refers to a political discourse that divides 
the society into two antagonistic groups: rural versus oligarchy (a rhetoric). The seventh type of use of 
the term populism refers to the attempt by the elites of the South American countries to manage the 
modernization process led by foreigners by putting the state in the role of a central defender of national 
identity and promoting national integration through economic development (a specific economic pol-
icy).
 In 1998, De la Torre narrowed down the abovementioned methodological-explanatory approaches 
and identified only three main approaches to the analysis of Latin American populism and stated the 
methodological approach he preferred. First, these methodological-explanatory approaches included 
Germani’s concept of populism as a transitional phase during the modernization of Latin America, 
when populist adherents were understood to be easily manipulated masses (the transition deviation).
 The second concept understood adherents of populism as a result of the inter-class alliance of the 
popular sectors – the middle classes and the new elites – against oligarchic regimes. The resulting 
regimes were authoritarian because they did not respect liberal-democratic standards and their social 
policies were popular-democratic (a movement).
 The third concept was theoretically based on Laclau’s analysis of populism and empirically on dis-
course analysis discussed later in the text (rhetoric).
 De la Torre’s new concept is actually the adaptation of Roberts’s explanation which understands 
populism as a failure of representative institutions to function as a mediator between the state and the 
citizen (an outcome of a certain type of situation).79 It may be clear that the first and the last explana-
tions are, at their core, identical, and they refer to internal causes of populism, while the second and 
third concepts are referring to external forms of this phenomenon. We will come back to this observa-
tion later.
 Stewart80 saw the possibilities of analysing populism in three ways: either as a system of ideas, a 
few specific historical phenomena or as a product of a particular type or types of social situation(s). 
Stewart’s approach has a weak point in the fact that these explanations do not exclude one another, 
but, on the contrary, they overlap. The first explanation does not distinguish populism from a standard 
ideology. While it is true that even ideologies are not ultimately consistent, they still represent a coher-
ent and stable set of views, which is not the case for the majority of populist leaders.
 From more recent work, Kubát81 considers Weyland’s approach to be correct, that is, the under-
standing of populism in the sense of politics; it is seen as the acquisition and execution of political power. 
However, it is not clear in what context should his populist action be seen as a specific or extraordinary 
78 De la Torre, “The Ambiguous,” 386.
79 In De la Torre, “Populist.”
80 Andrew Stewart, “The Social Roots,” in Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics, ed. Ghita Ionescu and 
Ernest Gellner (London: Macmillan 1969). 
81 Kubát, “Úvod.”
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phenomenon. For example, elections are a contest for the acquisition and execution of political power 
regardless of whether populism is present or absent.
 We see that neither previous nor some relatively recent approaches are useful in furthering the 
theoretical development of research and understanding of populism. 
 Now we come back to Laclau82 who summarized his earlier approaches to the study of populism 
through four basic categories, three of which, according to Laclau, describe populism as both a move-
ment and an ideology, while the fourth approach reduces populism exclusively to an ideological phe-
nomenon.
 Laclau’s first analytical category regards populism as a typical feature of a specific social class 
that can vary in different countries and time periods (e.g., the Russian narodniki or the agrarian pop-
ulism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Laclau criticizes this approach based on the 
fact that these types of populism do not really have anything in common except that they are considered 
populist, which does not actually explain the causes of their origin (a class approach).
 The second analytical approach Laclau called a type of theoretical nihilism. Analysts in this group 
consider populism to be an empty concept (as theoretical nihilism), which should therefore not be used 
at all. Instead, they suggest that research should focus on the direct analysis of movements that are 
considered populist, namely the analysis of their class structure. 
 According to Laclau, the class approach to populism (as well as the second, nihilist approach) to 
analysis does not offer adequate analytical solutions because the class of populist movements is very 
diverse and combines something that is difficult to define or even something that can only be “pure 
illusion or a mere delusion”, and, despite that, this factor must be explicable.
 The third approach does not regard populism as a movement but as an “empty” ideology charac-
terized by hostility to the status quo, mistrust of traditional politicians, appeals to the people rather 
than to social classes or groups, anti-intellectuals and the like (ideology).
 This approach is found, for example, in Učeň83. According to Laclau, such an approach faces two 
problematic issues: The typical features of populism are presented in purely descriptive form and do 
not explain the role of the populist element in the emergence of a populist phenomenon.
 The fourth approach presents populism as a deviation in the process of transition from a traditional 
society to an industrial society (functionalist concept). We have often encountered such an explanation 
of the causes of populism in the countries of South America and post-communist countries. However, 
according to Laclau, this concept is analytically the most consistent, yet it is rebutted by the historical 
experience of populism in industrialized European countries at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
We can also add that it is also to be found at the beginning of the twenty-first century, for example in 
the United States or the United Kingdom, see, for example, Kurtbağ.84
 Moreover, Laclau claims that “the experience with fascism is regarded as a sui generis form of 
populism”.85 Laclau further states that, despite the formal signs of modernization, a particular society 
as a whole may be more traditional than other societies in view of some of its features. Laclau asserts 
that the term “modern” society in this context loses analytical meaning. Laclau then characterizes 
populism as a specific non-trivial contradiction expressed in a discourse that refers to the people, 
with the concept of people having no specific definition.86 Laclau introduces the relative continuity of 
82 Laclau, Politics, 144 et seq.
83 Učeň, “Populist Appeals,” 19.
84 Ömer Kurtbağ, “ABD’de Yükselen Popülist Dalga ve Trumpizm: Neoliberal Küreselleşme, Ekonomik Kriz, Siyasetin 
İşlevsizleşmesi ve Elitizme Karşı Bir Geri Tepki mi?” Gazi Akademik Bakış 13, no. 26 (2020): 135–164. However, 
Andor, “Against,” claims that in the cases of the UK and the USA, there is essentially nationalism present, not pop-
ulism.
85 Laclau, Politics, 153.
86 Laclau, Politics, 164–166.
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folk traditions as an important explanatory element of populism, which, however, does not create the 
essence of populism. What transforms ideological discourse into populist discourse is its peculiar form 
of articulation of human-democratic interpellation.
 Thus, Laclau’s earlier definition of populism was as follows: “Populism is a presentation of human-
democratic interpellations as a synthetically-antagonistic complex with regard to the dominant ide-
ology”. Simply put, “populism begins where the human-democratic elements are presented as an 
antagonistic option against the ideology of the dominant bloc”. The word “antagonistic” holds high 
importance as it distinguishes populist discourse from discourse based on “differences”.87 Laclau ends 
his earlier analysis by claiming that “the emergence of populism is linked to the crisis of dominant 
political discourse, which is, at the same time, an element of the general social crisis”.88 It should be 
pointed out that Edelman89 defines the crisis as the creation of the language used to describe it: “The 
emergence of the crisis is a political act, not a discovery of a fact or of a rare situation.” In other 
words, crisis may be real, fabricated or exaggerated. This is an important suggestion which may help 
us further in explaining the flourishing of populist phenomena under relatively normal circumstances. 
Because of the importance of crisis in politics, especially in the news media, “crisis discourse” is an 
indispensable part of a policy and a particularly populist policy that itself arises from a deeper societal 
crisis or at least from a society that creates presumptions for populist discourse.
 There is a reason for Laclau to be considered one of the most important sociologists of the twenti-
eth century. Laclau could also draw knowledge directly from his life experience or from the experience 
of his native Argentina, which had been through one of the most traumatic periods of populism in his-
tory with consequences continuing to this day. Laclau later explained the logic of populist rhetoric and 
logic.90 Laclau begins to draw his construction of populist logic using the term “demand”.
 Laclau distinguishes the difference between demand and request. If a request is not met, it adjusts 
to a demand. If there are many such demands, the legitimacy of state authority and the antagonistic 
relations between the elites and the excluded (or unsatisfied “applicants” – citizens) become more 
complicated. In the given situation, a form of negative solidarity can arise between different unfulfilled 
requirements, as all the requests are shared by the fact that they are rejected by the state authorities. 
Laclau considers this an equity chain that creates the preconditions for the emergence of populism. The 
equity chain has an essentially anti-institutional position. In addition to the primary institutions, the 
enemy may also be something else (e.g., the media), but, in any case, there will always be some enemy 
needed. Laclau then asks, who will represent all these unfulfilled demands? They should be trans-
formed into a single request, which itself then ceases to be, but eventually becomes the embodiment of 
all other demands. This is known as the empty signifier. Populism then represents a political logic or 
action, a politics that consists of expanding the chain of equivalences and their representation by one 
element at a time. The representation can be almost anything, and as the number of partial problems/
themes gradually grows, the representation of them all very often ends up being a charismatic leader.
 According to Laclau, populism is not everything that appears as populism (i.e., not all the mes-
sages that have been said or promised during an election campaign), but only what appears to be a 
constrained logic of expressing these contents. In addition to this, political practice may not express 
the nature of social factors, but it can create them. The content of populism cannot therefore be found 
in any particular political or ideological content/context. It follows from this theoretical analysis that 
populism is not an ideology as we traditionally understand it – as a more or less logically coherent set 
of ideas and concepts about the proper functioning of society. It is neither a “thin” nor a “thick” ideol-
ogy.
87 Laclau, Politics, 172–174.
88 Laclau, Politics, 175.
89 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 31.
90 Ernesto Laclau, The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (London: Verso, 2014), 180–191.
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 Nevertheless, it is possible to describe the core of populist argumentation in the Laclauian sense. 
This is described eloquently within the liberal-democratic context by Blokker91:
 A particular set of populist arguments involves the absolute prioritization of the people, their (arbi-
trarily defined) political participation and their sovereign will, resistance to elitism and estab-
lishment, the demand for radical freedom and “direct democracy”, “defection” of the alienated 
people (where estrangement is considered the result of artificial constructions by legal-rational 
institutions) through the unification of the people with political power, coupled with dishonourable 
formal institutions and pluralistic representative democracy, as well as an organic and undivided 
vision of the “people”.
The discursive aspect of populist mobilization is also highlighted by Hermet92 – in a way that interprets 
social reality. Hermet also mentioned three other discourses: demagogic, fascist and communist. The 
table below, which is taken from Buben, Němec and Dvořáková’s book93, clearly illustrates these dis-
cursive differences.










Relation to the 
People
Impersonation 
of the real people in 
populist discourse
The representative  
is a people’s 
benefactor
The leader controls 
the still imperfect 
people, who need to 
be changed











Diagnosis Reality described in 
condemning manner
The description of 
reality – real allega-
tions are missing
Reality described in 
condemning manner 
but with reference 











Demand for sacrifice 
and courage




The necessity of 
a fundamental 
reform
Unexpressed Enemy “A big fig leaf”
91 Paul Blokker, “Post-Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in Europe,” European Journal of 
Social Theory 8, no. 4 (2005): 503–525.
92 In Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 143.
93 Buben et al., Que el pueblo.
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As put by Andor94, a politician who seeks support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary 
people rather than by using rational arguments is a demagogue, although in journalistic or popular 
discourse, this is often confused with the word populist. 
 Let us now turn to Laclau’s general concept of populism which is closely related to the abovemen-
tioned rhetoric. Buben, Němec and Dvořáková95 and many others criticize Laclau for his final concep-
tion of populism. These authors argue that it is too broad a concept. As such, it seemingly does not offer 
any operational criteria for the further analysis of populism. Specifically, Kubát96 denotes Laclau’s 
concept of populism as being of little use and, additionally, labelled it as the least often used. However, 
as mentioned, Kubát also claims that it can serve as some sort of a “reflection bridge” for understand-
ing populism as an ideology. Buben, Němec and Dvořáková97 agree with the importance of Laclau’s 
concept in defining the measure of populism, but they also take issue with the absence of criteria that 
would differentiate the scale of populism (minimum–maximum).
 We can presume that if Laclau defines the causes of populism’s emergence correctly and simulta-
neously correctly identifies the essence of its discourse, it does not have to imply that he is also obliged 
to offer practical criteria for the analysis of populism (that is to say its empirical analysis). This is 
another task which is, to a large extent, normative98. In other words, the acceptable scale of populism 
depends on its negative impact on society,99 the definition of a context (who are the people and who 
are the elites), the historical and local context (who and what influences the level and transformation 
of populism) and on the subjective opinion of observers or voters (in what state is the people’s rule/
democracy, how do the people assess fairness in a society).
 
Turning Laclau’s Theory into a Research Tool
Coming back to the previous issue, a more attentive reader can find the possibility for the practi-
cal empirical analysis of populist phenomena in Laclau’s theory of populism supported by Rooduijn’s 
empirical comparative research.100 We have two key points here: First, it is a general crisis.101 More 
specifically, within representative liberal democracy, populism is the answer to the crisis of represent-
ative liberal democracy.102 Researchers should focus on revealing the nature and causes of an existing 
general crisis in society103, crisis which appears to have been dealt with inadequately or not efficiently 
enough or remains unresolved, crisis which does not appear to have been articulated in public discourse 
and in public policies in the right way and with sufficient attention paid to it. Through this theoretical 
94 Andor, “Against.”
95 Buben et al., Que el pueblo, 149.
96 Kubát, “Úvod,” 14.
97 Buben et al., Que el pueblo.
98 See e.g. Morgan, “Cultural Sociology.”
99 For example, populists in opposition do not have to cause much damage and can even help serve as a corrector in a 
democracy if there is a captured state. Or, as Klaus von Beyme put it in “Populism Typologies in the Age of Globalisation 
and Post-Democratisation,” in Right-wing Populism. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40 (Cham: 
Springer, 2019): “Right-wing populism can act as a barrier to right-wing extremism.”
100 Rooduijn, “The Nucleus.”
101 See also Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political Studies 47, no. 1 
(1999): 2–16, Hanspeter Kriesi, “Revisiting the Populist Challenge,” Politologický časopis – Czech Journal of Political 
Science, XXV, no. 1 (2018): 5–27. 
102 Artem S. Abramyan, “About signs of populism,” in: Bulletin of Moscow Region State University (e-journal, 2020): 3, 
www.evestnik-mgou.ru, Drozdova, “Populism,” Baiocchi, We, the Sovereign.
103 See e.g. Blondel, “Populism.”
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analysis it becomes evident that studying charismatic leaders and populist elements is secondary to the 
analysis of populism. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of populist discourse, including party or elec-
toral manifestos, is important. The importance of such an analysis is related to the previous point – it 
may help to reveal the nature and causes of the crisis in society. 
 As Cohen104 puts it, “Anxieties about status honour and material precariousness in contexts of 
profound political, socioeconomic, and cultural transformation are key to understanding successful 
populist mobilization and electoral authoritarianism.” 
 Considering the abovementioned synthetic nature of populist discourse, a proper analysis must go 
beyond what appears to be the single most dominant discursive element. In other words, the roots of 
crises may be hidden in the most dominant current of the discourse. For example, as summarized by 
El Ghoneimi105, who held talks on European issues with French citizens living in small French towns 
and villages: “Immigration and identity are real topics, but they mask other economic and social griev-
ances that concrete policies can and must address.” It is far more important, in terms of understand-
ing populist discourse to know and to understand exactly which themes a unifying populist discourse is 
trying to express. These topics may be ignored and/or suppressed in official public or media discourses. 
It is of lesser importance who is expressing them.
 Thus, what is ultimately needed is a situational analysis, also known as situational logic. If Laclau 
speaks about political logic, situational analysis is how Karl Popper believes social sciences can gen-
erate falsifiable and, therefore, scientific hypotheses.106 Situational analysis provides the means to 
specify and map all the important human and non-human elements of a situation, emphasizing rela-
tionships, social worlds and discursive positions. In situational analysis, the social world and collec-
tive commitments and actions of participants within that world are the units of such analysis. It is 
an approach to research that uses a grounded theorizing methodology to identify and describe social 
worlds and arenas of action and does so by representing complexity through mapmaking.107 
 Proper situational analysis and mapmaking can help us see populism from a less normatively nega-
tive perspective. According to Schmitter,108 the key question to ask is whether populism will eventu-
ally turn into an authoritarian movement or whether it will remain a democratic or, more precisely, 
a democratizing phenomenon, which, for example, may put forward previously ignored and/or even 
rather untouched topics. In other words, it is important whether populism can respond to sociopoliti-
cal challenges that traditional political parties do not appear to have considered as urgent problems. 
This was the case, for example, in Austria and even more so in Italy until the beginning of the early 
1990s, both of which featured widespread popular disaffection and disenchantment with the estab-
lished political parties, politicians and the political process in general. 
Conclusion
It is argued here that populism is not democratic illiberalism but rather a formal political logic (poli-
tics), associated rhetoric and ensuing political action without a predetermined ideological content. 
Naturally, populism can take the form of democratic illiberalism (or illiberal democracy) if it emerges 
104 Jean L. Cohen, “Populism and the Politics of Resentment,” Jus Cogens 1 (2019, n.p.): 5–39.
105 Schams El Ghoneimi, “The EU is under attack from the far right. Here’s how I learned to defend it,” The Guardian, Febru-
ary 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/06/eu-far-right-steve-bannon-citizen-debates.
106 Kevin D. Hoover, “Situational Analysis,” The Center for the History of Political Economy Working Paper Series 2016–
17 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736927.
107 See Adele E.Clarke, Situational Analysis: Grounded Theory After the Postmodern Turn (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005).
108 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Vices and Virtues of ‘Populisms’,” Sociologica 13, no. 1 (2019): 75–81, https://sociologica.
unibo.it/article/view/9391/9197.
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within liberal-democratic societies, and it may most likely end up as so if there are no checks and 
balances available. Obviously, it opposes the backbone of a political system that is seen as partly or 
fully dysfunctional. This conclusion was made possible using Laclau’s general concept of populism. For 
Laclau, populism is a symptom of a deeper crisis that is expressed in the form of a constrained logic of 
expressing what we call specific populist rhetoric. The difference between demagoguery and populism 
should be maintained. 
 The universal content of populism cannot therefore be found in any particular political, ideological 
or geographical context. There are, however, some common features that seem to be universally asso-
ciated with populism: a deep, fundamentally moral crisis as a prelude; an unrecognisable magnitude 
or urgency of the crisis as a condition; and manifested or performative features, such as old elites as 
enemies, mass mobilization, importance attached to the popular will or to the “people” in general, no 
identifiable ideology, evolutionary politics (if it is revolutionary or anti-system, then it is, e.g., commu-
nism or fascism) and, finally, a charismatic leader is usually identifiable. However, charisma is under-
stood here as a contextual phenomenon; thus, without crisis, there would be no charismatic leader. A 
charismatic leader may be replaced by another central convergence point, e.g., an online news portal, 
a blog or a social network.
 Moreover, to understand the roots of populism, research should utilize the situational analysis 
approach and thus focus on revealing the nature and causes of the existence of a general crisis in 
society that does not appear to be (in whole or in part) articulated in the public discourse and in public 
policies. Inferentially and paradoxically, studying charismatic leaders and other populist elements, 
however interesting and useful, is actually secondary to the analysis of the roots of populism.
